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Abstract
This paper presents a calculation of the time series of the
after-tax rate of return to whole life insurancy. When compared to the
after—tax return on an alternative portfolio of similar risk, more than 60%
of the decline in life insurance savings (suitably defined) in the past two
decades can be attributed to a widening after-tax rate of return differen-
tial.
Both the existence and importance of this result depend on the
characteristics of life insurance savings. Life insurance saving is inti-
mately connected to life insurance coverage and therefore is long—term and
quasi—contractual in nature. Furthermore (and, in part, because of the
above characteristics), the interest earned on the fixed income portfolio
of life insurance intermediaries has been taxed under a special set of
rules. From 1958 to 1981
,theserules have taken the rather complicated
form of the Menge formula. This formula is very sensitive to changes in
nominal interest rate levels and in particular, during inflationary periods
it acts so as to dramatically increase the tax burden of life insurance
savings.
Life irsurance savings is therefore an example of the non-
neutrality of monetary policy. This is important for studies of flow of
funds and capital accumulation using the historical record.
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(617) 868—3941LIFE INSURANCE SAVINGS AND THE AFTER-TAX
LIFE INSURANCE RATE OF RETURN
The relative place of life insurance in United States household
savings has declined since the mid 1950s and indeed this decline has acce—
lerated in recent years.1 Combined dth the phenemona of the increaseduse
of policy loans, the net savings flow through the lifeinsurance intermediary
as a percentage of personal disposable income has been reduced.
Table 1
LIFE INSURANCE SAVINGS AS A PERCENTAGE OF INCOME
Year Gross (%) Netof Policy Loans (%)PremiumSavings(%)*
1952—56 1.14 1.07 0.43
1957—61 0.92 0.79 0.17
1962—66 0.96 0.82 0.18
1967-71 0.80 0.56 0.07
1972-76 0.75 0.58 0.06
1977-81 0.70 0.44 0.05
*Defined in text.
Any explanation of the reasons for, and financial/non-financial
effects of this decline must, at least in part,depend on the peculiar
characteristics of life insurance savings. As will be explained in this
paper, life insurance savings are intimately connected with the provisions
of the permanent life insurance policy. Namely, it is apolicy that pro-
vides life insurance coverage in addition to savings, isquasi—contractual
in nature and whose return is taxed (through the intermediary) undera
special set of rules known as the Menge formula. As a result of these
peculiarities, among possible reasons for the decrease in life insuranceare decreased demand for the life insurancecoverage component of an indi-
vidual life insurance policy. Decreased insurancedemand might be due to
sociological considerations such as smaller family size and the increased
economic independence of women, or to increasedexogeneous insurance
protection in the form of group life insurance fromemployers, and sur-
vivors benefits from the Social Security Administration.
Alternatively,
the increased exogeneous provision of contractualsavings in the form of
pensions aiid Social Security retirement benefits lessens theneed for
savings of the type connected with the life insurance contract.Finally,
any increase in the after tax rate of return differential between alter-
native endogenous savings vehicles and life insurancesavings such as might
occur due to differential tax treatments (and inparticular, as will be
explained, under the Menge formula in inflationary periods)can be a reason
for the decline in life insurance savings.
While there is an element of truth in all threeexplanations of
life insurance's relative decline, thispaper exphasizes and explicitly
tests for the effect of differential taxationof life insurance savings.
There are two reasons for this choice. One ispracticability. With a
proper understanding of the life insurance intermediary and itstaxation,
it is possible to specify the after-tax returnon life insurance savings
and compare it to the returns on alternative formsof household savings.2
It is much more difficult to explicitly formulateand test models incor-
porating the first two explanations. The second reason isa judgment,
based in part on some casual empiricism and inpart on econometric evidence
presented in the last part of the paper, that the trend andvariability in—2—
the after—tax rate differential explains themajor share of the trend and
variability of the propensity to save through life insurance. Anexample
of casual empiricism debunking the decreased lifeinsurance coverage demand
theory is the introduction (in 1965) and subsequentpopularity of term
(pure) life insurance coverage policies.
The reasons for the decline in life insurancesavings should have
more than parochial or academic interest. Shifts insavings patterns
affect the term structure of interest rates and theconfiguration of port-
folios, thus indirectly and directly affecting the size and nature ofcapi-
tal formation. This has been shown to holdespecially in the case of life
insurance savings.3 If life insurancesavings has been subject to
increased (differential) taxation, there are furtherimplications. Before—
tax long—term interest rates, ceterus paribus, shouldrise4, thereby
lowering optimal debt/equity ratios and capital formation.Finally, if
increased (differential) taxation caused a reduction inlife insurance
savings and if life insurance is the only endogeneous contractualsavings
contract available to households, then in addition to theabove occurences,
there will have been a drop in the savings rateof the economy and there-
fore in the steady—state capital labor ratio.5The magnitudes of these
effects, of course, depend on the relevant magnitudes of life insuranceand
other savings flows.-3-
asReasons for Life Insurance Savings
Alongwith commercial banks, life insurancecompanies were the
first financial intermediaries in the Americaneconomy.6 There were, no
doubt, many reasons why this form of intermediation occurred inthe late
1800's and early 1900's, some of whichmaystillexist today (see below).
Even if the positive economic reasons for life insurancesavings no longer
exist, however, life insurance companies would continue to havean impor-
tant place in personal savings simplyby virtue of their previous
existence. Thus if the industry is flexible in itsreactions to economic
changes, andisnot impeded by any competitive disadvantagesimposed exter-
nally, there is sufficient reason to explain the phenomenonof savings
through life insurance by institutional factors alone.Implicit in any
institutional explanation of nonatomization and statusquo is the indus-
trial organization theory of high initialstart—up costs and scale eco-
nomies. These costs, in the case of financialintermediation, mayinclude
gaining a trustworthy reputation, forming consumer habits,necessary scale
economies in the assumption of financial risk, and scalesin production of
inside financial information and transactions. Theimplication of this
non-specific approach is that explanations for variations,trends, and/or
structural changes in life insurance savingsare the same as those for
changes in the economy-wide savings rate --nationalincome (in a Keynesian
interpretation), after—tax interest rates (in a classical interpretation)
and other variables that comeup in the life cycle—liquidity constraint
context.—4-
Before mentioning the possible specific economicreasons for life
insurance savings it will be helpful togo over some of the particulars of
life insurance contracts. The following 2x2 matrixexhibits the four main
















A life insurance policy is a contract between thepolicyholder
and the life insurance company that entitles the holderto certain benefits
under certain life contingencies in exchange fora premium payment to the
company. Under a constant term life policy, the insurancecompany agrees
to pay a fixed amount (the face value of thepolicy) to the named benefi—
ciary upon the death of the insured, in exchange for payment ofa premium
that increases with the age of the insured. The increasesrepresent
increasing mortality probabilities. There are no other benefitsand in
particular no cash value. A permanent life policyprovides in addition to
death benefits, the lifetime benefit of a cash value.In return for—5—
payment of a usually constant premium, the insurancecompany agrees to pay
a fixed amount (the face value) to the namedbeneficiary upon the death of
the insured, to pay an accumulating cash value (lessthan the face value
until the policy's maturity) anytime the policyholderlapses the policy, or
to lend up to the accumulated cash value to thepolicyholder if the policy
remains in force and interest payments are paid atan interest rate as set
forth and fixed in the policy at the time of sale. Themost fruitful way,
therefore, of looking at a permanent life policy isas a combination of an
accumulating savings account and a declining term life insurance contract.
Part of each premium pays for term insurance andpart enters a savings
account. Since the cash value of the policy and theamount that corres-
ponds to actual term life insurance always addup to the fixed face value,
as the amount in the savings account accumulates, the termcomponent must
decline. Therefore, as a permanent policyages, it becomes more and more a
savings account.
Still another categorization is used for lifeinsurance
contracts, in a participating policy, the holderparticipates in improve-
ments in the company's mortality experiences andinterest income via
payments of dividends by the company. In anon—participating policy, the
implicit interest and mortality rates are fixed at the time of thepolicy
sale and no payments are ever made to reflect improvementsin these rates.
Most permanent policies are participating.7—6—
The close institutional connection between the term lifeinsur-
ance ad savings components of a permanent life contractuggest several
positive economic reasons for savings through life insurance. Since term
life insurance premiums are paid annually (oreven more frequently), from
the point of view of both policyholder and insurancecompany, average
transaction costs can be reduced if a savings plan is tacked ontothe life
insurance policy. More specifically, the policyholdereconomizes on time,
effort, and check clearance costs if he invests at thesame time as he pays
his insurance premiums. The marginal costs for the insurancecompany of
initial bookkeeping record maintenance, and investingpremium payments
(both direct brokerage costs and financialresearch-management fees) are
almost zero once a term life contract has been made. Thereforethe life
insurance company can afford to (implicitly) charge less forits investment
sevices than other financial intermediaries andcertainly less than direct
investment bonds with high commercial brokerage fees. Thisargument is
especially true for small investors.
A second reason for saving through life insuranceis economic
self—control.8 In other words, permanent life insuranceoperates as the
life—cycle version of a Christmas Club. The features of apermanent life
policy ——constant,periodic required payments whose neglect results in the
cancellation of life insurance protection ——meshwell withthecharac—
tistics of a forced life cycle savings plan ——highlyregular installments
with a large penalty for disruption. While otherlong—term private savings
plans can be designed, any enforcement besides cancellation ofa service
connected with the regular payment is probably illegal. In thecase of-7—
life insurance the penalty of temporarylapse of insurance protection is
augmented by the possibility that through the usualunderwriting process,
subsequent life insurance will be impossible or moreexpensive to obtain.
There is also a further fianncial penalty forearly lapsation, as will be
mentioned below. Of course, it is possible to maintainlife insurance
coverage, avoid lapsation and still disrupt the savings plan byborrowing
against one's cash value via a policy loan. Thereare no legal or other
restraints against doing so, and when interest ratesare above the policy
loan rate, there are addi tional interest andtax arbitrage incentives to
such behavior. Such an occurrence has becomemore commonplace, but con-
sidering, for example, the rate differential between a 5%policy loan rate
and 15% yield on LU bonds in 1981, it is remarkablethat such behavior is
not more widespread.9
The first two reasons for the relative attractivenessof saving
in a life insurance company- depend on thepeculiar existence of the life
insurance component of the contract. It is alsopossible that the
existence of the savings component reduces the cost andensures the exis-
tence of the pure life insurancecoverage. It has been recognized that the
singular problem of competitive insurance markets isanti—selectjon.1O A
company may offer term insurance at the average mortality rate fora parti-
cular age—sex combination in the population,only to have low risk indivi-
duals avoid the purchase of insurance ordrop it soon after purchase, and
high-risk individuals rush in to buy and maintain thefavorably priced
policies. The result, of course, is that the insurancecompany will lose
money and there is a distinct possibility that the entire market will dis—-8-
appear. The theoretical mechanism proposed to ensure an insurance equi—
librjum ——thesimultaneous control of insurance price and quantities
allowed to be purchased ——issubject to two attacks, however.ll It is not
robust to all forms of strategic behavior and does notseem to be empiri-
cally founded. Rather, the real world devices of underwriting (thereby
removing the underlying informational asymmetry), highpressure sales,
group insurance and permanent insurance have arisen. It isrelatively easy
to see why the device of high pressure saleshelps alleviate the problem of
anti—selection. If insurance is "sold," instead of "bought,"a more repre-
sentative mortality sample is thereby assured. This is confirmedwhen it
is noted that those companies who mostcarefully underwrite their policies
have the lowest key "soft sell" sales teams.12 Toexplain why permanent
insurance alleviates the problem of anti—selection,more background is
needed. Due to a large initial commission paid to theagent upon the sale
of a permanent policy and the savings withpenalty nature of the plan,
legal and competitive conditions allow insurancecompanies to delay the
natural accumulation of cash value severalyears into the life of the
policy. In other words, a policyholder is severely penalized if helapses
his permanent policy early in its lifetime. Thuspermanent policyholders
are less likely than term policyholders to lapse theirpolicies either
after a hard sale or after further information about one'som mortality
prospects becomes available. In this manner, anti-selection is avoidedand
the existence of life insurance markets is ensured (atlower average cost).—9—
It should be parenthetically remarked thatlife insurance savings
have a slight advantage over other forms ofsavings as a bequest. Since
1840, the law provides that the proceeds of apolicy made out to a widow as
beneficia.y would be paid to her and are exempt from claimsof creditors.
The implication of this highly specificapproach is that short
of examining trends in relative transactioncosts, the psychological
necessity for self—control, the existence of other forms of contractual
savings such as pensions, or the complicated issue ofvariation in mor-
tality risk within demographic groups, the closeconnection between life
insurance savings and life insurancecoverage indicates that explanations
for variations, trends and/or structuralchanges in life insurance savings
are the same as those for life insurancecoverage demand. These variables
might include life insurance—in—force under SocialSecurity, real income,
and sociological considerations such as numberof children and their age
distribution, future prospects for the widow (or widower),extended family
structure, an& so on.
While both the non-specific and the above—mentionedspecific
approaches to life insurance savings are interesting andappropriate, we
look at another aspect of the problem here. Weinvestigate the after—tax
return to life insurance savings andcompare it to the after-tax return on
a "home—made" bond fund of similar maturity and risk. This isa specific
approach that can be specified. Furthermore, if thereare no other savings
instruments available in the economy that have thecharacteristics of a
quasi—forced savings plan with low transactioncosts, it is clear that a
change in the third specific characteristic ——theafter—tax interest rate—10-
differential ——willresult in a one-for—one corresponding change in the
savings rate.
There are three reasons why there would be an after-tax interest
rate differential between buying a permanent life insurancepolicy with
full expectations of keeping it in force and buyinga series of long—term
bonds.
1) The interest rate implicit in the life insurancepolicy differs
from that available in the long-term bond market.By law and by
conservative business practice, life insurance companies them-
selves buy bonds for their portfolios. Therefore,any interest
rate difference as perceived by the prospective life insurance
investor must be due to the institutional practices of the life
insurance intermediary. In particular, when someonepurchases a
life insurance policy, he receives the currentaverage rate of
return on the company portfolio, and not the marginal rate of
return on new money. When market rates suddenly increase and the
average maturity of the company portfolio is fifteen years, a
small wedge appears between the return from purchasing the life
policy and paying premiums for the next twenty years and con-
structing one's own bond portfolio by periodic purchases over the
next twenty years. Furthermore, if the life insurancecompany is
constrained to earn below market rates on part of its portfolio
even in the future (for example, on policy loans), thewedge is
enlarged.—1 •1 —
2)The interest rate differential may also be due to differences in
costs. While we mentioned several reasons why transaction costs
might be lower for life insurance, there are other costs tocon-
sider. In particular, sales agents receivea large initial sales
commission and smaller renewal commissions for the life of the
policy, as long as they work for or are vested with the life
insurance company.
3)Finally, an after—tax interest rate differential mightappear if
the two forms of investment are taxed differently. Interest
income on directly held bonds is taxed under the individual
income tax. Interest income on life insurance isexclusively
taxed through the company under the federal life insurance
company income tax acts (we study the 1952 and 1959 Acts) and
state premiumtaxes.It is not surprising that there should be
a difference arising from these different forms of tax treat-
ments. In fact, the difference is large and has changed
dramatically over time.—12—
2. Sone Actuarial Mathematics
Our goal is a variable defined as the after—taxinterest differ-
ential between paying premiwns on a permanent life insurancepolicy for
twenty years and. similar investment in a AAA long—term bond fund. We
introduce some actuarial notation that will be helpful inapproaching the
life insurance rate of return computation. The standard referencesfor
actuarial mathematics are Kellison (1970) and Jordan (1975).
-theeffective rate of interest; that is, the amount ofmoney
that $1 invested at the beginning of theyear will earn during
the year, where interest is paid at the end of theyear.
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i.e.,that the net level premium is a combination ofa savings fund level
premium and a premium for decreasing term insurance.
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a insured at age x ——orthe policy
reserve ——theexcess of the present
value of the future benefits over the
present value of the future net premiums.






E' -initialloading for expenses. A policy's
value is therefore close to its reserve
amount, especially in the later years of
the policy.
It can also be shown that
t+ivx _(1+j)tv=p(l+j)_X+tl_v)
x+ t
that is, the real change in reservesequals premiums paid at the beginning
ofthe period (both for the savings fund and forthe declining term
insurance) accumulated at interest less the costof insurance based upon
the net amount at risk for the (t+i)thyear. The total real change in
insurance reserves is the real change for theaggregate of all groups I
insured.
w
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Therefore, if the "life insurable" (adults with families)population is
growing at a constant and savings through life insuranceis a constant—16—
positive function of income, then the total realchange in insurance
reserves (premiumsavings)would be
where in is the differential growth rate between thelife insurable popula-.
tion and the income producing population, anda is the life insurance
savings rate. If all life insurance were terminsurance,then a would be
zero.
In this paper, c, the currentafter—tax life insurance rate of
return is calculated based on Imowledge of the currentaverage earnings
rate on investments as reported to the National Associationof Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) and the federal tax law in effect.It is hypothesized
that a is a behavioral function of the after—taxinterest rate differen-
tials mentioned above. In other words, netpremiums paid for permanent
life insurance, depend on alternative after—taxyields. (Life insurance is
assumed actuarially fair and inisassumed constant.) The rate differen-
tial, which is really the heart of thepaper, derives from thepcted
after—tax level effective life insurance return,as computed below, and the
expected after—tax level effective long—term bond return, alsocomputed
below.-17-
3. A History of Life Insurance Company Taxation
Even though our study starts in the 1950's, itwill be useful to
review the trends in life insurancecompany taxation from 1921 forward.
The account here derives from Valenti (1957). Themain issues that legis-
lators have had to deal with are whether lifeinsurance is a service (and
thus should be taxed like other businesses)or a savings institution (and
therefore should be taxed similar to banks), whethermutual (participating)
life insurance companies are profitmaking ventures or not, how to deal
with for—profit stock (non—participating)companies, how to tax the income
from new life insurance company products (e.g.pensions, health insurance,
term life), and how to recognize the long—runnature of the business. From
1921 to 1941, the "free investment income" taxapproach was used. The
assumptions were that there could be no trueunderwritingincome since, in
the aggregate, from anygroup of policies the premiums collected would
actuarially be sufficient Only to meet loading costs (administrative and
acquisition costs) and present and future claims under thisgroup of pol-
icies. (Correct actuarial procedures and eithercompetitive pricing or
fair participating dividends are assumed.) Theonly taxable income was
investment income after deduction of i) investmentexpenses and 2) addi-
tions to policy reserves of interest earningson such reserves. The inter-
est income deductible was 4% applied to the mean of thereserve amounts for
the years 1921 to 1931 and 3—3/4% for 1931 to 1941.Any interest earned
above that amount was taxed at regularcorporate tax rates. This formula
eliminated underwriting profits completely, aswas reasonable when most
life insurance companies were participating. Inpoint of fact almost no-18-
federal taxes were paid throughout thisperiod due to a retroactive legal
ruling in 1928 and low market interest rates for therest of the period.
The "industry ratio" method was used in the taxformulas applic-
able to the years 1942 through 1957. Under thismethod, the allowance for
interest requirements was computed as theproduct of the company's net
investment income (excluding tax-exempt interest)and a percentage either
fixed by statute (as in 1951 through 1957)or determined according to a
formula specified in the law (the "Secretary's ratio"for 1942—1950). The
Secretary's ratio increased slowly from 92% in 1943 to 96% in1946, but
then suddenly it rose to over 100% in 1947 and1948; i.e. life insurance
companies paid no federal tax for the years 1947 and 1948.Although the
1942 formula remained on the books as the "permanent" taxformula through
1957, it was superseded on a year to year basis after 1948by various stop-
gap measures. In the formula applicable to the years 1951 through1957,
the allowance for interest requirementspermitted each company was, in
effect, 87—1/2% of its investment income.
In 1958 and continuing until 1982, anew, more complicated,
method of taxation was adopted. It is basicallyan "adjusted reserve"
method. The adjusted reserve is determinedby adjusting the company's
total reserves to the amount of reserves whichwould have been held using
the interest rate on which the statutory credit forreserve interest is to
be based (while retaining the use of themortality and morbidity tables
actually employed by the company). Thus, if thestatutory credit is based
on the assumption that, on the average, 3% reservesare being held, each
company would compute its credit as the product of (i) 3%and(ii) the—19—
amount of reserves it would have held if all of itsreserves had been based
on a 3% interest assumption. By providing for thissort of adjustment of
reserves before the application of the interest deductionrate, the
"adjusted reserve" method corrects one of theprincipal deficiencies of the
"free interest" method: the defect thatcompanies with otherwise similar
operations might pay significantly different amounts of taxsolely because
of differences in the average reserve interestrates employed. In particu—
lar, it eliminated the differential tax treatment ofparticipating (low
reserve interest rate) and non—participating (higherreserve interest rate)
permanent policies.
Obviously, if the "adjusted reserve" method were to beapplied on
an exact basis, a company would have to make one valuation forannual
statement purposes and another for federal income taxpurposes. There is,
however, an actuarial rule of thumb which can be used inapproximating
changes in reserves arising from changes in the assumed interestrate.
This rule provides that for typical distributions of lifeinsurance poli-
cies by plan, age at issue, and policyyear, an increase (decrease) of 1%
in the reserve interest rate will result. ina decrease (increase) of 10% in
the amount of the reserve. Under this rule, knownas the "ten—for—one" or
"Nenge" rule, if the average required interest rate fora company's
reserves is 2-1/2%, for example, the amount of reserves which would have
been held on a 3% interest assumption can beapproximated by multiplying
the reserves actually held by 95% (100% minus1/2 of 10%). For small dif-
ferences in interest rates, the conditionprevailing in the 1950's, the
rule works well. As the difference increases, theapproximation becomes—20—
less and less accurate. For large differencesthe poor approximation can
result in a very heavy tax assessment. Thiscertainly occurred in the
1970's since the interest rate used under the"adjusted reserve" method is
defined as a function of the individual company'sinterest earnings rate,
which increased dramatically from the interestused in the original reserve
calculations.—21—
4. The 1959 Life Insurance Company Income TaxAct
A mathematical representation of the1959 tax law was first given
by Fraser (1962). The main results arereproduced here. Tinder the law, a
tax at the regular corporate rates is imposedon the company's "life insur-
ance company taxable income." This taxable income is thesum of three
parts, called phases in the law, as. follows:
i) mm[T,G]
ii) 1/2 (G—T) <o
iii)W
T is the Taxable Investment Income
C is the Gain from Operations, and
W is the Amount Withdrawn from the Policyholders'Surplus Account.
T is basically computed under the "adjusted reserve"approach.
In regard to C, the aggregate deductions fordividends to policyholders and
for certain other items have been limited to$250,000 plus the excess, if
any, of the Gain from Operations C (before taking account of these deduc-
tions) over the Taxable Investment Income T (i.e. theunderwriting gain,
U), CT +U—$250,000.Thus, under the 1959 law, a mutual company gen-
erally is not able, by increasing the amount of dividendspaid to policy-
holders, to reduce its taxable income below Taxable Investment Incomeminus
$250,000. For most mutual companies, therefore, the "life insurancecom-
pany taxable income" will, under present conditions (i.e. reasonable divi-
dends), be equal to the T -$250,000.For a stock company, 1/2(G-T) <0,
is also taxed, and the other half is added to thepolicyholders' Surplus—22—
Account. Additions tothe,Surplus Account are not treated as taxable
income until withdrawn from this account either topay dividends to stock-
holders or to reduce the amount held in the account tothe maximum per-
mitted under the law. In point of fact, no Phase3taxhas ever been
levied. Furthermore, we will onlyinvestigate Phase 1 taxation, since only




I is the Investment Yield, which isequal to the company's gross
investment earnings less the deductionspermitted for investment
expenses and taxes, real estate depreciation, etc. Investment
Yield includes fully and partiallytax-exempt interest and all
dividends received on corporate stocks.
(cs)T is the Company's Share (defined below).
1nt is the amount of tax—exempt interest and thetax—exempt portion
of dividends received on corporate stocks.




I is the current earnings rate and is computedby dividing the
company's Investment Yield by the mean of the company's "assets"
at the beginning and end of theyear. (Except for taxes and—23—
certainaccounting differences, it is identical to iused in the
actuarial calculations above.)
is the adjusted reserves rate; it is the smallerof (a) the
current earnings rate and (b) the average of the currentearnings
rate for the present year and those for the fourpreceding years.
P is the mean amount of pension planreserves.
V1 is the amountofadjusted life insurance reserves other thanpen-
sion plan reserves (see below).
K is the amount of direct interest paidduring the year.
I is the Investment Yield.
=v(i+10r— lOi')
Where:
V is the mean amount of life insurancereserves other than pension
plan reserves.
is the average assumed interest rate for such lifeinsurance





V is the mean amount of reserves valued at the rate
rk.
(rIc depends on the rate allowed in the state non—forfeiturelaw
in effect at the time the policy is issued. Ithas hardly
changed over time.)-24-
For example, if the adjusted reserves rateis 6% and the average
valuation interest rate is 3%, the adjusted lifeinsurance reserves would
be equal to v[i +lo(.03)—lo(.o6)]=.7V.It will be recognized that
this reserve adjustment represents anapproximate adjustment based on the
"Menge"rule.
The taxfunction is homogeneous in the first degree, aside from
the constant statutory deductions and limitations.Therefore, a company
that is, say, exactly twice the size of anothercompany in the same tax
situation will pay exactly twice the tax (except to theextent of the tax
effects attributable to the constant statutory deductions andlimitations).
This is a fortunate result; it means thatwe can aggregate over different
size companies without having to know the size distributionof companies to
compute the effective after—tax life insurance return.—25—
5.Formulas for Current and Expected Future
Life Insurance Rates of Return
Under the following assumptions T, taxableinvestment income,
simplifies.
a) The company correctly assigns interestand tax liability to
its pension and non—pension accounts.Therefore, we can ignore P
in the formula.
b) The company does not invest intax—exempt securities. Until
recently, it would not have done so, since the marginalafter-tax
return from taxed securities was higher than themarginal after-
tax return from tax—exempt securities. (Thisis due to a quirk
in the law, as can be shown.)
c) S and K can be ignored.
d) I =i(v+)=iA.Assets defined in the 1959 law include
assets resulting from surplus funds and other lifeinsurance com-
pany obligations, such as incurred expenses, mandatoryreserves
for fluctuations in security values and insurancepremiums paid
in advance. These assets are denotedby .Theratio V/V+ is
assumed to be constant throughout the period studiedat .85.
This assumption is supported by examining the lifeinsurance
industry balance sheet.—26—
e) t is the corporate tax rate. Therefore
T =t[iA(1.xi'V(l+lOr_lOi'))]
=t[iA—i'V(l+lO—loI')].













If t =.50, =.03and i .12, then the elasticity is = = .0599,
that is an increase in interest rates, has at themargin and under reason—
able conditions, a much less than one forone proportional increase in the
current life insurance rate of return.
We have found the i to be used in theconstruction of the depen--27-
dent variable. It is possible to proceed from here to the constructionof
i, the expected level after-tax life insurance rate of returnon a policy
held for twenty years, or 80 quarters.l3 Theapproach taken is to solve for
implicit that satisfies S
80
1= bT,where bT has been calculated by
algorithm. This is done numerically, as an explicit analytical solution of
an 80—degree polynomial is imposible. It is done forevery quarter
(denoted T) from 1952:1 to 1982:2, based on the interest and taxrates then
prevailing and expected to prevail.14
It is probably easiest to write out the algorithm explicitly and
explain the assumptions afterwards.
(1) i =(i











+.02381e 0 < t < 59
1t1e 61 <t<79










16 < t < 39
40< •t79
for 1952:1 <T <1956:4
(6)















1952:1< T < 1982:2
We start our explanation with equation (1), building the struc-
ture from the ground up. 4A1c is the same rate used inconstructing
above. 'BAAo is the rate on new long—term BAA bonds, theprimary security
that life insurance companies have purchased for their portfolio. .002 is
subtracted out because of the costs due to investment expenses and expected






.T .T T.T ='t
—t
it
T 'T, ________ + ti \.85)(1 +10-T-10i')
I —t+iEt
mod(-.—)
0 <t <79;for1957:1 <T < 1982:2—29—
policy loans on newly issued policies. is the current proportion of
policy loans outstanding to reserves. It is assumed that all these rates
and proportions will continue into the future ——basicallythe assumption
of a flat yield curve and stable insurance behavior. and 'PLCYLt are
the actual rates prevailing t quarters previous to T. is the pro-
portion of new policy loans to reserve increase t
Iquartersprevious to
T. We include policy loans because, especially in recentyears, they have
been a drag on the ability of life insurance companies toget new market
rates. Equation (2) exhibits the fact that the life insurancepolicyholder
receives the average rate of return and therefore can expect to receive
market (marginal) rates, i, only after some time. Thespecific assump-
tions imbedded here are that the portfolio turns over (on average)every
fifteen years and is growing 1.3% per quarter. The securities retired in
the current quarter are 1/90
1
of the portfolio ((i.013)1 =90) 1.013 1=0







Theaccuracy of these assumptions can be checked by comparing the rate of
return on our hypothetical life insurance portfolio at apoint of time with























Equation (3) is self—explanatory and is necessary because of the
tax formula. Equation (4) lists other expenses specific to life insurance.
The first number in the Et sum represents the sales agent's commission on
premium paid for the tth quarter after policy purchase. These are New York
State legal maximums and they haven't changed over the period being inves-
tigated. .022 is the average state premium tax. This figure has also been
steady over time. It should be noted that these percentages of premiums
paid are absolutely large, and in periods of low interest rates, relatively
large also. Equation ()isself—explanatory in light of the "Menge" for—
mula and represents the after—tax, after—expense expected rate of return t
quarters after T. The form of expenses subtracted was chosen for analyti-
cal convenience. It basically says that a declining proportion ofexpenses
is subtracted from total interest earned on an individual's life insurance
account. While not technically correct, the correct formulation (adding
still another subscript on i to distinguish betweenpositive commissions
and state tax expenses subtracted from interest on new money and zero—3 1—
expensessubtracted from interest on old money) would have beenimpossible
toprogram. Therefore an"on average" approach was chosen. Finally,




is the level effecjve after—tax life insurance rate ofreturn.
T1/ T (1 +'E =(1+i)
f(iT)=( +•T + (1÷ iT)2 +...(1+.T)80 -bT=0
0=
i](i.T +1 )—bT
Using a Newton-Raphson iteration
bT
with





.T .T4 in converges to 1 .Finally, =(i+1 )— 1.
Therate of return on the alternative bond portfolio is duck
soup. It is simply
0[(i.T\80
=+iI —




where tT is the individual income tax on interestincome, 'AAAo is the
current yield on new—issue AAA long—term bonds, and.003 represents
various, unspecified, investment expenses. Again, a flat yieldcurve has
been assumed. The independent variable,therefore, is
** RDIFF= - 1AAA
vT_(l+jT)VT_1 ** LISRY= c
is the dependent variable,l5 where is personal disposable income.—33—
6.Empirical Results
The regression using these variables for the period 1959:1 to







































RDIFFdropped approximately 2.4 over the period, while LISRY
dropped approximately .0040 over the period. Our regression explains
(.ooiog)(2.4)=65.4%ofthe drop in LISRY.
In another regression (not shown here), a trend variable was included. The
size of the RDIFF coefficient barely changed and it remained significant.-34-
There is, therefore, econometric support for theoriginal contention that
the tax treatment of life insurance savings (inan inflationary environ-
ment) has been a significant determinant of the amountsaved.
If life insurance savings is moretraditionally defined as
VT —vT_l,then the life insurance savings rate can be denoted as
LISYT =(vT-T1)/yT and the following regression results for theperiod
1959:1 to 1982:1
Dependent Variable: LISY
Coefficient T—Stat Independent Variable
.00850 38.99 Constant






2) -.00027 -1.940 SEASON Q1
3) -.00030 -1.899 SEASON Q2




CT Thisregression is not surprising when it is realized that
has been added to the right hand side of the equation, which ads tothe—35—
constant term and is colinear with RDIFFT. LISY droppedapproximately
.0045 over the period. The second regression explains
(.oo148)(2.4178.9%of the drop in LI
There are several caveats to this empirical work. The problem of simultan-
eity bias presumably lurks in the regressions. A proper specification of
interest rate determination, such as might occur in a simultaneous
equations flow—of-funds model with due consideration of taxes would solve
that problem. The assumption of a constant personal tax rate isa weak one
and ultimately should be replaced. This improvement, however, wouldlikely
support our results since marginal tax rates were very high in the 1950's
and recent inflationary increases in personal tax rates in noway cancel the
after-tax rate differential reported here. Indeed, improved specification
would probably be enough to include the 1952:1 to 19584period in the
regressions. Further research on these points would seem desirable.—36—
7.Conclusion
The main substantive results have already beenstated in the
introduction. One methodological point, however, hasyet to be stated. As
is emphasized in Feldstein (1982), a wellspecified fiscal framework is
necessary for a complete analysis of monetary policy. Increases in the
inflation rate are clearly not neutral in thecase of life insurance
savings due to tax considerations and it is reasonable toexpect that simi-
lar non—neutralities induced by taxes exist.This is not logically sur-
prising, because as in the history of life insurancetaxation, there is a
close connection between an industry's tax mechanismand its institutional
characteristics and structure.—31—
Footnotes
1. See Friedman (1980) for a discussion of these and related changes in
post—war American financial markets.
2. Other studies of life insurance savings flows either assume that the
flows are exogenous (Hendershott, 1911) or depend simply on the private
placement yield (Cuirmiins, 1915).
3. This is because life insurance companies mainly invest in long—term
corporate bonds and mortgages. See Friedman (1982).
4.SeeFeldstein (1918a) for a general model.
5. For interesting (and different) macroeconomic implications of life
insurance savings flows see Geren (1913) and Feldstein (1982).
6.SeeKeller (1963) for a detailed history of the early industry.
7. This institutional review is taken from Warshawsky (1982).
8.Thalerand Shefrin (1981) give a rigorous treatment of the idea. It is
also connected to issues of the investor's horizon and holding period.
See also Feldstein (1918b).
9. Warshaws1r (1982) develops a model of policy loan demand where self—
control is implicitly assumed to be the behavioral background.
10.Rothschildand Stiglitz (1916) introduced the problem into the litera-
ture.
11. The existence of equilibrium under different behavioral assumptions in
a continuous parameter model is discussed in Riley (1979).
12. This is a personal observation.—38—
13.The twenty year average persistency was computed as follows:
140
1/140ST =20.5.I.e. the lapse rates are uniform throughout the
hypothetical range of forty years. In 1911—12, the empirical average
persistency was closer to fifteen years.
114. The year 1951 is included even though the tax law only applied to 1958
and beyond. Since the computation involves future interest rate expec-
tations, it is reasonable to also make an assumption regarding expec-
tations of the future tax law. It was known as early as middle 1956 that
the Treasury Department was proposing an increase in life insurance
company taxation. It is assumed that this information was widespread
and furthermore that some knowledgeable guesses could have been made
about the form of the new law.
15. The assumption of 1.3% quarterly growth in reserves derives from a
regression of log V on time. It therefore implicitly includes interest
earned and reinvested. The 1.3% figure is also relatively steady for
the period studied.
16. In defining the dependent variable, T obviously must be the quarterly
(and not annual) interest earned. This is because we are investigating
quarterly increases (decreases) in life insurance savings flows and
using quarterly reserve numbers. Furthermore, T is computed using
actual interest rates and tax laws, not expected ones. Therefore, the
1959 law applies only back to 1958, and not 1957, as it does for i.—39—
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1962:1 .00291 I 2.70 3.16 f .518
:2 .00213 2.70 3.12 .606
:3 .00122 2.70 3.14 .590
:4 .00035 2.70 3.08 .600
1963:1 .00149 2.70 3.06 .600
:2 .00188 2.70 3.11 .570
:3 .00247 2.70 3.09 .520
:4 .00300 2.70 3.09 .483
1964:1 .00207 2.70 3.11 .482
:2 .00186 2.70 3.14 .480
:3 .00192 2.70 3.11 .464
:4
J .00204 2.70 3.12 .436
1965:1 .00149 2.70 3.13 .457 :2 .00239 2.70 3.18 .466
:3 .00255 2.70 3.22 .456
:4 .00197 2.70 3.26 .409
1966:1 .00152 2.70 3.42 .367
:2
J .00102 2.70 3.69 .365
:3 .00104 2.70 3.92 .270
:4 .00144 2.70 4.01 .339
1967:1 .00105 2.70 3.77 .480
:2 .00122 2.70 3.94 .442 :3 .00113 2.70 4.08 .338
:4 .00085 2.70 J 4.28 .177
1968:1 .00073 2.70 4.09 .061
:2 .00034 2.70 4.21 .021
:3 -.00105 2.70 4.13 .108
:4 .00172 2.70 4.23 —.010
1969:1 —.00018 2.70 4.35 .231
:2 .00028 2.70 4.44 —.296
:3 .00033 2.70 4.57 —.403
:4 .00106 2.70 4.74 -.697
1970:1 .00023 2.70 4.92 —.560 :2 -.00028 2.70 5.06 -.788
:3 .00021 2.70 5.01 -.479
:4 .00147 2.80 4.95 -.266
1971:1 .00087 2.80 4.64 .252
:2 .00088 2.80 4.70 —.008
:3 .00114 2.80 4.81 -.034






























































































































































































1981:1 —.00121 4.50 6.94 —1.813
:2 —.00221 4.50 6.98 —2.344
:3 -.00193 4.50 7.00 -3.114
:4 -.00075 4.50 7.00 -2.794
1982:1 -.00158 4.50 7.00 —2.933
:2 —.00159 4.50 7.00 -2.67
Note: All interest rates have been converted to percentages. In the
algorithms, decimals are used, while in the regressions, percentages in
RDIFF, decimals in LISRY. Raw data wasprovidedcourtesy of Data
Resources, Inc., (Flow of Funds) and the American Council of Life Insurance
(annual Fact Book and other documents).